Re: FreeBSD Security Advisory: FreeBSD-SA-01:18.bind
From: Doug Barton (DougB@gorean.org)
Date: 02/01/01
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Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2001 18:15:50 -0800 (PST) From: Doug Barton <DougB@gorean.org> To: Alfred Perlstein <bright@wintelcom.net>
On Wed, 31 Jan 2001, Alfred Perlstein wrote:
> Since named supports a command line option for chroot as well
> as user flags (-t) it would be trivial to have it the defaultt.
Actually, it's not trivial to do the chroot version properly.
There are several files, directories, and one device that have to be
created in the chroot environment. Also, /etc/ is not a good choice for
the chroot, it really should be something like /usr/named, or
/usr/local/named since the quantity of zone files could be quite large,
and variable in nature.
> It's pretty much a toss-up between usability and security.
When done properly (with appropriate compiled-in defaults) the
only functionality you lose is the ability to bind new interfaces while
named is running. As Matt pointed out, this "feature" is of dubious value
at best.
> I guess this is the final blow for me, and I think we should
> run bind in a sandbox at this point, I'm just worried about
> confusing newbies who wish to set it up.
>
> If anyone has a proposal on doing it by default that doesn't
> impact ease of use (or if already doesn't impact it) then I'm
> for it.
Jeroen and I are kicking around some ideas. I'm thinking of a
make.conf variable that will specify the location of the chroot dir.
Something like BIND_CHROOT=/usr/local/named. Questions to be resolved are;
location, default to on or off, etc. So far there is pretty good support
for at least providing the option to do this in the base, so I think it
will happen sometime "soon," depending on how soon the two of us (or
someone else) can get to it.
> What I'm worrying about specifically is ndc and other utilities
> basically are unix domain sockets not in the expected place all of
> sudden?
That's one of the things you compile in. Let's say that you want
your chroot to be /usr/local/named. You set DESTRUN in the bind makefile
to /usr/local/named/var so named knows where to write it's FIFO when it
starts up, and you make that var directory rw for the bind user. QED.
BTW, just running with -u bind -g bind does not constitute
"running in a sandbox." It does help to have bind drop privs, but the
chroot stuff is what constitutes a true sandbox.
Doug
--
"Pain heals. Chicks dig scars. Glory . . . lasts forever."
-- Keanu Reeves as Shane Falco in "The Replacements"
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