Re: FreeBSD Security Advisory: FreeBSD-SA-01:18.bind

From: Alfred Perlstein (bright@wintelcom.net)
Date: 01/31/01


Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2001 14:54:23 -0800
From: Alfred Perlstein <bright@wintelcom.net>
To: Brian Behlendorf <brian@collab.net>


* Brian Behlendorf <brian@collab.net> [010131 14:47] wrote:
> On Wed, 31 Jan 2001, Alfred Perlstein wrote:
> > * Roman Shterenzon <roman@xpert.com> [010131 13:56] wrote:
> > > On Wed, 31 Jan 2001, FreeBSD Security Advisories wrote:
> > >
> > > > =============================================================================
> > > > FreeBSD-SA-01:18 Security Advisory
> > > >
> > > > Topic: BIND remotely exploitable buffer overflow
> > > ..snip..
> > >
> > > Why not make it default in the base system?
> >
> > It has been, but only for several days.
>
> I think he meant, why not set those recommendations for running as user
> "bind" and in a chroot jail as the default? Unless I'm missing something,
> that's not the case currently:
>
> [yez] 2:47pm ~ > fgrep -i named_flag /etc/defaults/rc.conf
> named_flags="" # Flags for named
> #named_flags="-u bind -g bind" # Flags for named

Since named supports a command line option for chroot as well
as user flags (-t) it would be trivial to have it the defaultt.

It's pretty much a toss-up between usability and security.

I guess this is the final blow for me, and I think we should
run bind in a sandbox at this point, I'm just worried about
confusing newbies who wish to set it up.

If anyone has a proposal on doing it by default that doesn't
impact ease of use (or if already doesn't impact it) then I'm
for it.

What I'm worrying about specifically is ndc and other utilities
basically are unix domain sockets not in the expected place all of
sudden?

-- 
-Alfred Perlstein - [bright@wintelcom.net|alfred@freebsd.org]
"I have the heart of a child; I keep it in a jar on my desk."
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