Re: [fw-wiz] How should an Internet connection/firewall be designed?

This would be a legitimate and perhaps interesting application of an external IDS, but automated correlation is still relatively unexplored territory. I suspect that few organizations that actually do a CBA conclude this is a priority allocation of time, talent and technology.

To your observation about "seeking professional help": I imagine that any organization that would insist on such alarms *and* insist that IT staff actually investigate/attend would experience sufficiently high staff attrition rates to cause them to reconsider.

Carson Gaspar wrote:
Dave Piscitello wrote:
Kaas, David D wrote:
How many companies have an IPS/deep-packet-inspection device between the
firewall and the border router?
I honestly don't see a lot of this and unless there's a specific DOS prevention issue, I don't see a lot of point in policing traffic that I expect my firewall to block.

Back when I still did security for a living, I was a supporter of having an IDS device between your border router and your external firewall. However it was not for the reasons most folks might think. I wanted the external IDS in logging-only (no alarms) mode, purely for forensic and legal purposes. When we saw something funky on our internal/DMZ nets, we could look at the external logs to see if it was part of an attack pattern.

Of course there is a cost/benefit analysis that has to be done to determine if the data mining is worth the cost of the device.

I agree that anyone who has alarms enabled from an outside-the-firewall IDS probably ought to go see a professional about their paranoia issues...

fn:David Piscitello
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