Re: [fw-wiz] The Death Of A Firewall

From: Julian M D (julianmd_at_gmail.com)
Date: 10/26/05

  • Next message: Steven M. Bellovin: "Re: [fw-wiz] Legal Release for Security Work"
    To: firewall-wizards@honor.icsalabs.com
    Date: Wed, 26 Oct 2005 14:09:19 -0400
    
    

    So basically he's saying that he's safer now because of the "DMZ" created by
    the L3 Switches???? with 3 layers of application servers running in VIRTUAL
    OS's????
     I'd say the safest method is the one that best suits your needs, not only
    from the security point of view, but TCO, ROI, manageability...etc.
     What I agree on is the fact that, security must be covered from INSIDE-OUT.
      Julian Dragut
    Secure the LAN first
        On 10/17/05, Pedski <pedski@optonline.net> wrote:
    >
    > James Paterson wrote:
    >
    > >http://www.securitypipeline.com/165700439
    > >
    > >Be interesting to get the communities take on this article.
    > >
    > >_______________________________________________
    > >firewall-wizards mailing list
    > >firewall-wizards@honor.icsalabs.com
    > >http://honor.icsalabs.com/mailman/listinfo/firewall-wizards
    > >
    > >
    > >
    > This is a model that has holes...
    > router acl are not statefull.
    > they seem to have some secutiy by means of DMZ
    > the managemnt overhead of this is high..sometimes is not that easy
    > deploying patches if the vulnerabilty came in the night...meaning if you
    > are blocking everything with a firewall you bought yourself some
    > time....in this case they are open ...the term raise their immunity to
    > exists in hashers condition sounds really nice...but often attacks or
    > worms come like a thief in the night......
    >
    > there is something flawed with this architecture.
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  • Next message: Steven M. Bellovin: "Re: [fw-wiz] Legal Release for Security Work"

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