Re: [fw-wiz] Host based vs network firewall in datacenter

From: Chuck Swiger (chuck_at_codefab.com)
Date: 06/11/05

  • Next message: Rob Hughes: "Re: [fw-wiz] so much for "deny all""
    To: "Zurek, Patrick" <pzurek@uillinois.edu>
    Date: Fri, 10 Jun 2005 21:14:18 -0400
    
    

    Zurek, Patrick wrote:
    > I graduated from university not long ago and assumed my first job as network
    > administrator in a small datacenter. I've been lurking here for a while and
    > reading the archives. I've learned a lot from what many of you have had to say,
    > but I'm having difficulty making the jump from the theory behind the way things
    > should be run (ie. the network design maps that show the little switch, router
    > & firewall symbols) and the practical applications of that.

    Well, congratulations on your new position. The best way to move from theory
    to practice is to sent up a small test network or two, and see what "doing it
    for real (almost)" is like.

    There are two books that you need to get, read, and then re-read until you've
    gotten their contents down: "TCP/IP Network Administration", and "Building
    Internet Firewalls".

    > I was also reluctant to make this post in fear of getting flamed for having
    > what will come across as a cluess attitude about network security. Instead
    > of flaming, please correct me, I want to learn.

    While it's true that this list has some fine arguments, most of them are
    friendly. :-)

    > I'd like to solicit some advice on a firewall implementation. Our solaris
    > only site has two main components, a web presence which connects to a backend
    > application running on top of Oracle, and a custom application (which
    > unfortunately also runs on the same host as the database) to which our clients
    > connect. So all our servers need to be internet facing including the database.

    OK. I would start by confirming the requirement for being Internet-routable,
    especially with regard to the database, assuming that contains the stuff you
    want to protect.

    If you can put your DB on a private network and have just the few machines
    which genuinely need access able to talk with it, that would probably help your
    security out by a useful amount...

    [ ... ]
    > These are the options as I see them:
    > 1) Wide open - keep the hosts locked down tight and keep open services to a minimum.
    > 2) Host based firewall - put ipf on the hosts
    > 3) Network firewall behind the router - ???
    >
    > 1) Does not seem feasible to continue to operate this way.

    This approach can work for a while, but it's dangerous.

    For instance, you can have services reappear after you apply a patch cluster,
    as a new version of the /etc/init.d scripts might be plunked down and turn
    stuff back on that you'd previous disabled....

    > 2) As a short term measure I have applied ipfilter on several of our non
    > production hosts. My manager has began to advocate putting it on all production
    > systems now (about 15 hosts).

    Host-based firewalls tend to be more useful on Windows boxes, since they can
    reduce viruses propogating outwards. Not as important on a Solaris box. It's
    better than nothing, but your network is still highly vulnerable a lot of
    things like IP spoofing via source-routing.

    > 3) This option is good because it will allow us to apply stateless ACLs at
    > the gateway and centralize the management of firewall functions.

    Yes. You can use a firewall as a bridge, not a router, if you don't want to
    adjust your subnetting and have to renetwork your production boxes.

    Whether you use stateless rules or dynamic ones is more a matter of taste and
    how you've locked the boxes down. The important thing is that the firewall
    will provide a chokepoint where you can inspect, block, and monitor traffic, as
    well as a spot to prevent people from spoofing internal IP addresses.

    -- 
    -Chuck
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  • Next message: Rob Hughes: "Re: [fw-wiz] so much for "deny all""

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