RE: [fw-wiz] A few sql 2000 related questions

From: Paul Melson (
Date: 02/14/05

  • Next message: Ofer Shezaf: "RE: [fw-wiz] Application-level Attacks"
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    Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2005 10:15:53 -0500


    A1: Bindview is a decent tool, but it really depends what your goals for
    monitoring are. If you're trying to identify and/or prevent a compromise of
    the server and its data, that is different than creating an audit trail for

    A2: It's probably not. SQL Server can use SSL. You can also use the MS
    implementation of IPSec to encrypt traffic between two servers. Either way,
    I would double-check my configuration with tcpdump or something similar to
    make sure the more secure transport method is being used.

    Vyas Kondreddi has an excellent article on SQL Server security. Anybody
    interested in this topic, or even disinterested people tasked with
    protecting MS-SQL databases should give it a read:

    Also, both of those proposed traffic/app flows have some major blind spots,
    and I wouldn't pay the consultants who proposed them for the napkin they
    wrote it on.

    First of all, and there is some debate on this, but I feel strongly that
    network IDS/IPS has no place outside of a firewall. I can go on for days
    about reasons why this is, but the main reason is that it is a huge waste of
    relatively expensive and limited personnel resources to make someone wade
    through IDS reports on traffic that never enters the network. That *is* why
    the firewall is there, after all. And yes, this will definitely impact the
    overall security of the environment if you're trying to protect an
    unfiltered baseline.

    Second of all, has anyone accounted for how the IDS/IPS will analyze SSL
    traffic? I am only aware of two products that can do stream analysis of SSL
    connections, and they require copies of all of the server certificates to do
    so. Still others do this by being the SSL endpoint and reverse proxy. But
    if the product in question doesn't do these things and/or isn't configured
    to do them, you've wasted some $$ on an IDS/IPX box.

    Third, I would need to hear the reasoning behind this, but I'm not sure why
    you're using 'vpn' to pass traffic from one set of servers to another,
    especially if traffic is (or at least can be) encrypted by the endpoints.
    This isn't so much a 'flaw' that I see, but rather a red flag that the
    proposals' author(s) may have been focused on using "security" technologies
    without a lot of regard to how they actually impact the overall security of
    the environment.


    -----Original Message-----
    Subject: [fw-wiz] A few sql 2000 related questions

    I'm new to the list, so forgive me if the questions have been asked before.

    1/ First, are there "best practices" relating to security MONITORING of sql
    servers? And tools to do so? We have a copy of bindview for SQL. I
    haven't had a chance yet to look over it.

    2/ We currently are running a web server that has SQLServer 2000 on it.
    I haven't had time for an exhautive review, but I don't think the SQL
    connection is "protected" using ssl (which I have been led to believe is
    best practice).
    So for "back office" connections, is ssl best practice? What about taking
    SQL OFF that machine? The cuurent protection goes as follows:

    inet -> fw->(ssl) dmz (reverse proxy)->fw->web server running IIS/SQL-->back
    office fw-->SQL "feeders"

    The current solution is completely outsourced, but we are planing to change
    that this year to just web hosting where we have more control.

    One proposal I have is the following

    inet-->IPS-->fw->dmz (ssl) web server->fw->(ssl)sql server->vpn(with
    acls)->back office fw dmz->(ssl)back office feeder servers


    other proposal is

    inet-->IPS-->fw->(ssl) inverse proxy->fw->(ssl) web server ->(ssl)sql
    server->vpn(with acls)->back office fw dmz->(ssl)back office feeder


    Thanks for your feedback,

    firewall-wizards mailing list

  • Next message: Ofer Shezaf: "RE: [fw-wiz] Application-level Attacks"

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