Re: [fw-wiz] Defense in Depth to the Desktop

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To: Chris Pugrud <cpugrud@yahoo.com>
Date: Mon, 13 Dec 2004 16:30:23 -0500 (EST)

On Mon, 13 Dec 2004, Chris Pugrud wrote:

> > This
> > > is the classic "eggshell" weakness of network security, hard and crunchy on
> > the
> > > outside, soft and chewy on the inside. The Strong Internal Network Defense
> >
> > I don't think I'd use eggshell to denote hard ;)
> >
> But I would. It's relatively hard compared to what's inside, but, as you note
> above, it's not actively reinforced, tested, or updated, so it's probably
> pretty weak on an absolute scale. I recently performed an assessment for a
> customer that began with them bragging about how tight their firewall ruleset
> was. After the assessment I complimented the "tightness" of the ruleset but
> noted that all of their "DMZ" servers were dual-homed. One interface on the
> Internet, one on the inside, completely bypassing the firewall.

I'm dealing with one of those right now too, severely over-done hardware,
over-complex network and multi-homed everything (Windows boxes too, WINS
doesn't like that!)

> > I've only ever seen internal firewalls implemented at extremely large
> > organizations. Making it a routed network helps some with the MS stuff,
> > but it's so uncommon to see internal routing in small companies who don't
> > have the admin resources to not be totally killed by a big malware event.
> >
> I prefer to work with organizations in the 100-300 size. They usually have
> limited internal routing and some decent hardware (depending on position in
> Hype/Budget/Funding scale). I was just searching for something that is a bit
> easier to explain and apply to the people that write the checks and is more
> effective than sacrificing rubber chickens at dawn (err, I mean nifty do
> buzzword compliant gimmick of the week).
>

Sure, but I really guess I'm not seeing this as a solution for a firewall
more than it's a solution for an internal network architecture...

> > Unless, for instance your administrators are remote, and they need to have
> > access to the client's registry from a server they remote into...
>
> There are accomodations for this scenario when you get to the analysis. I on;y
> presented the 2 cell compartment model for illustrative purposes. I guess you
> still get what you pay for.

Indeed, I've just been doing some consulting at some small sized companies
recently and all the stuff that I'd never do on a network I designed seem
to be in place and common (*sigh*.)

> > > In addition to the firewall, the client systems are fully isolated from
> > each
> > > other by layer 2 controls (private vlans). The servers may be similarly
> > > isolated, but doing so is minimally effective and damaging to server to
> > server
> > > communications.
> >
> > Why not just turn off automatic ARP on the clients and statically ARP them
> > to the router? (Hmmm, can you do that in Windows?)
> >
> You can do something "security" usefull in Windows? It is much easier, direct,
> and simple to do it in the switch where I can do it once and I know it will
> continue to work as programmed despite MS patch o' the day.

But configuration things, especially those which fit in a .reg file that
can go into a login profile are much more likely to be adopted than "buy
another firewall" things, no?

> > > Consider the introduction of a zero day worm virus [*2] into such a network
> > by
> > > an infected client. The client can attack all of the servers, and all of
> > the
> > > servers may become infected. The infected client can not attack any of the
> > > other clients because of the layer 2 isolation. The infected servers can
> > not
> > > attack any of the clients because of the firewall. The end result is that
> > one
> > > client and the servers, a small subset of the organization, are infected.
> > This
> > > is much less devastating, and much easier to clean up, than if the entire
> > > network was infected.
> >
> > Not if the worm is especially destructive, infect the servers and you've
> > killed the business if the critical business resources are on the servers.
> >
> Sure, the business is down, but only the servers have to be cleaned up, not X
> thousand client systems. I've seen (ok, heard it) it happen too many times
> where organizations had to send the entire workforce home so they could
> methodically work through the building disinfecting and patching every single
> end user system in the entire organization. I'd much rather have limited
> functionality and only have to clean up 20-120 servers.

Again, if the data's on the server, and the data's at risk, I'd rather not
see it happen.

>
> > > [*2] The infamous “zero day worm virus” is invoked as a worse case analysis
> > > because it invalidates anti-virus and patch defense mechanisms. Since
> > worms
> > > are increasingly targeting necessary network ports, personal firewalls are
> > also
> > > equally invalidated as a defense mechanism. Marcus can gleefully dance on
> > > their graves.
> >
> > I'm not sure this assumption carries fully- personal firewalls generally
> > allow per-process outbound traffic blessing- so the worm would have to hook
> > a service that's allowed to communication outbound- while that's been
> > done, it's certainly still true that personal firewalls are useful in
> > limiting the damage from most "downloaded and clicked" stuff, which is
> > where a good chunk of the risk exists. The rest of the risk is the laptop
> > that just walked in hibernated and infected, and the VPN user- heck,
> > quarantining the laptops for 90 mins when they first come in would
> > probably do about as well as anything...
>
> How many hundred times a day is a user going to "click" to access the
> organizational file server, email server, and porn (err proxy) server before
> they just enable some dangerously broad default allows? I recognize some value
> for personal firewalls, but I think that using personal firewalls, especially
> on deskbound organizational systems, puts us on the wrong side the tail chasing
> treadmill. You are talking about a lot of money and management and application
> management and helpdesk headaches that could be much more easily and cheaply
> and sanely managed at the core router/firewall/rubber chicken substitute.

Hmm, the user can't enable it in the "enterprise" versions, it's a company
or group-wide policy thing. I'm not sure it's a lot of support costs, and
given the amount of spyware and Trojans I've found recently- I'd say it's
almost a necessity. Firewalls don't stop this stuff without content
inspection and knowing what's bad- or disabling active content, and these
days, that's a difficult to win battle :(

PFWs seem to me to be a pretty good stop-gap. The ability to get back
some control over the desktop is worth its weight in gold- losing that
ground is what made the war swing against us!

> > > > Analysis
> > >
> > > The primary design of the model is to focus security resources on the
> > servers.
> > > No organization can reasonably maintain strict control over client systems,
> > but
> > > they do have absolute control over making sure that servers are currently
> >
> > Were it that easy- I've seen plenty of "we can't update that server
> > because $critical application will fail."
>
> Sure, that a risk that's easier to accept, to know that one system will be
> vulnerable and you can focus your energy on getting that one system updated and
> protected. That's a bit more difficult to do if your attention is "focused" on
> a few thousand desktops in various states of patch/AV/user disfigurement.

You're still going to have to deal with the desktops, because the users
are going to have to work and have critical files there. I think that I'm
probably more worried about spyware Trojans than worms right now- worm
events get lots of press, but the infestations are really ugly.

> > You could probably get about the same level of protection by assigning /32
> > addresses to the clients and only giving them a route to the router- no
> > need to tax the switches with newfangled-VPN-foo at all. You still get
> > some broadcast stuff, and you don't' want gratuitous ARP on, but I bet
> > it'd have about the same effect. You could then add interface routes to
> > the local host for those you wanted to interconnect at the local admin
> > level.
>
> Because this newfangled-VPN-foo (well, it's only a few years old (supported in
> Cisco switches at a minimum)) does that much easier and less messily than
> hyper-subnetting (/30 clients with router) or anything else I've seen. I'm in
> process of prepping a post about layer 2 isolation (aka private vlans) that
> does a much better job of articulating their virtues and uses than my previous
> attempt.

But then you've got a single point of failure, and just using a
255.255.255.255 subnet mask and a static route seems to be not that messy
to me. Plus it works no matter what vendor's gear you happen to hit-
that's always a bonus to me because the "switch just went down and we need
to put in whatever we can" scenario with little sleep needs to not carry a
bunch of administrative overhead.

> > > Application protocols that are broken are peer to peer systems and any kind
> > of
> > > desktop file sharing. This is strongly viewed as a good thing in most
> > > organizations. If I was an attacker going after juicy data the first place
> > I
> >
> > Shared stuff is becoming popular inside, like Netmeeting- I'm not sure
> > this is a good long-term strategy (I'm not sure it's not a great one too.)
>
> Better to just cut it off at the knees before the lusers get used to it.
> Seriously. The only way I maintain my sanity is the regular howls of laughter
> administered by user "requests" to do some thing assinine that is clearly not
> an actual business objective. Now when legitimized (not necessarily
> legitimate) business objectives elicit howls it is clearly time to polish the
> resume.

My normal perspective is exactly that, but it's way different when you're
going in somewhere that's already wrapped around it as process.

Paul
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paul D. Robertson "My statements in this message are personal opinions
paul@compuwar.net which may have no basis whatsoever in fact."
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• Previous message: Joe Mazzotti: "RE: [fw-wiz] Cisco Pix 515E Configuration"
• In reply to: Chris Pugrud: "Re: [fw-wiz] Defense in Depth to the Desktop"
• Next in thread: Frederick M Avolio: "Re: [fw-wiz] Defense in Depth to the Desktop"
• Reply: Frederick M Avolio: "Re: [fw-wiz] Defense in Depth to the Desktop"
• Reply: Chris Pugrud: "Re: [fw-wiz] Defense in Depth to the Desktop"
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