RE: [fw-wiz] Log checking?

From: Larry Pitcher (
Date: 09/30/04

  • Next message: Josh Welch: "Re: [fw-wiz] Pass-through VPN"
    To: "'Paul D. Robertson'" <>, 'Luke Butcher' <>
    Date: Thu, 30 Sep 2004 09:34:22 -0700

    Maybe this is too obvious to mention, but what I watch for in my firewall
    logs are denied connections trying to go from the inside to the Internet on
    closed ports. It gives me a look at misconfigured or infected PCs.

    Larry Pitcher

    Internet Product Manager
    Baker Boyer Bank

    -----Original Message-----
    From: Paul D. Robertson []
    Sent: Thursday, September 30, 2004 8:25 AM
    To: Luke Butcher
    Subject: RE: [fw-wiz] Log checking?

    On Wed, 29 Sep 2004, Luke Butcher wrote:

    > In this scenario I'm trusting the firewall to block all known bad. The
    > IDS is just a mechanism to sift the more 'interesting' stuff that's
    > gets THROUGH the firewall (from the outside).

    But, again- IDS is "known bad"- we don't get IDS signatures for "stuff we
    don't know is good."

    Strategically, I'm less worried about find things that will be IDS
    signatures next month than I am about finding things that will never be IDS
    signatures. Yes, that's a lot of data to deal with, but it's the
    higher-cost threats in my view, such as the bad insider, strategic
    compromise, etc.

    > Saves having to troll through all the traffic that gets past the
    > firewall, which is nearly all legitimate. Alerts in this case would be

    Ah, but what I'm suggesting is that for emergent threats, that trolling is
    actually useful.

    > When everything's coming your way, you're in the wrong lane.

    Nah, it just means you're in a target rich environment ;)

    Paul D. Robertson "My statements in this message are personal opinions which may have no basis whatsoever in fact." Director of Risk Assessment TruSecure Corporation
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