RE: [fw-wiz] VPN endpoints

From: Smith, Aaron (SmithA_at_byui.edu)
Date: 08/25/04

  • Next message: stephane nasdrovisky: "Re: [fw-wiz] Decrypted VPN traffic and access lists on outside interface of PIX"
    To: "hermit921" <hermit921@yahoo.com>, <firewall-wizards@honor.icsalabs.com>
    Date: Wed, 25 Aug 2004 08:49:42 -0600
    
    

    I think it really depends on the purpose of the VPN. I implemented a
    VPN solution that bypassed the firewall completely. Why? Because it is
    used for administrative network access, ie. in case the firewall was out
    of whack.

    For client access, my preference is to protect the VPN's external
    interface by putting it in the DMZ. Then put the internal interface
    inside. That way you can filter packets where they should be
    filtered--at the firewall.

    @@ron Smith
    "Let smiths perform the work of smiths."

    -----Original Message-----
    From: firewall-wizards-admin@honor.icsalabs.com
    [mailto:firewall-wizards-admin@honor.icsalabs.com] On Behalf Of
    hermit921
    Sent: Tuesday, August 24, 2004 11:37 AM
    To: firewall-wizards@honor.icsalabs.com
    Subject: [fw-wiz] VPN endpoints

    We are planning to put a VPN endpoint at our site for remote access. We

    know nothing about the remote client computers, we just provide an
    authentication mechanism for the users. The question concerns where we
    put
    the VPN endpoint on our network.

    I figure it this way: 2 VPN device interfaces, either of which can go
    outside the firewall, on a DMZ, or inside the firewall. That gives us 9

    possible arrangements, some of which are ridiculous, but fun to
    consider. We came down to two configurations.

    One approach is putting the internal interface on a DMZ. The other
    approach is to have the VPN bypass the firewall entirely. I am looking
    for
    advice on which approach is better, and reasons why.

    hermit921

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  • Next message: stephane nasdrovisky: "Re: [fw-wiz] Decrypted VPN traffic and access lists on outside interface of PIX"

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