RE: [fw-wiz] Worms, Air Gaps and Responsibility

From: Eugene Kuznetsov (eugene_at_datapower.com)
Date: 05/13/04

  • Next message: Paul D. Robertson: "RE: [fw-wiz] Worms, Air Gaps and Responsibility" 
    To: "'Dana Nowell'" <DanaNowell@cornerstonesoftware.com>, "'Paul D. Robertson'" <paul@compuwar.net>
Date: Thu, 13 May 2004 17:16:00 -0400

    [snip]
    > I'd argue that boxes with equal 'ubiquity' start with an equal
    > 'targetability coefficient' which is then adjusted based on
    > end use (kudos,
    > spam, intel, ...) and 'breakability'. Since Windows scores

    +1, very good points...

    It is the "level of functionality/complexity" (to first order, proportional
    to # of lines of code) X "ubiquity" X "value-of-seized-platform" X
    "security-quality".

    The more "connected" you are and the richer the interfaces that are exposed,
    the more security risk there is. That's why RPC interfaces are so much more
    dangerous that simple web servers, and web servers are more vulnerable than
    IP forwarding engines. The underlying security of the code is part of the
    issue, but it's an independent variable.

    \\ Eugene Kuznetsov, Chairman & CTO : eugene@datapower.com
    \\ DataPower Technology, Inc. : Web Services security
    \\ http://www.datapower.com : XML-aware networks

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