RE: [fw-wiz] Stanford break in

From: Carric Dooley (carric_at_com2usa.com)
Date: 04/23/04

  • Next message: Vin McLellan: "Re: [fw-wiz] Stanford break in"
    To: Victor Williams <vbwilliams@essvote.net>
    Date: Fri, 23 Apr 2004 02:58:20 -0400 (EDT)
    
    

    Until you root the box, which is often pretty trivial as well...

    A password file in plain view, an unpatched or misconfigured service...
    these are all part of a bigger problem. While I agree that discretionary
    access control at all levels is good, it becomes difficult to manage
    unless you can come up with a standard build and replicate it. Also, using
    a network directory reduces the need for local accounts.

    On Thu, 22 Apr 2004, Victor Williams wrote:

    > I'm still wondering why anyone would put their password file in plain view
    > of anyone that logs in...but maybe I missed something...
    >
    > Sticky bits and chmod/chown are your friend. It's a pretty trivial deal to
    > lock someone in a chmod "jail" on any Unix-like OS current within the last 8
    > years. They've even got filesystem and directory level ACLs now! My advice
    > to anyone is "use them...liberally."
    >
    >
    > Victor Williams
    > Network Architect, RHCE #809003618508044
    > Election Systems & Software
    > http://www.essvote.com <http://www.essvote.com>
    > vbwilliams@essvote.com
    > (800) 247-8683
    >
    >
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    >
    > -----Original Message-----
    > From: firewall-wizards-admin@honor.icsalabs.com
    > [mailto:firewall-wizards-admin@honor.icsalabs.com] On Behalf Of Laura Taylor
    > Sent: Thursday, April 22, 2004 4:40 PM
    > To: 'R. DuFresne'; 'Carric Dooley'
    > Cc: 'Chuck Vose'; firewall-wizards@honor.icsalabs.com
    > Subject: RE: [fw-wiz] Stanford break in
    >
    >
    > You need some user behavior/rules of engagement policies to deal with users
    > bringing home password files and cracking them. And they should be enforced.
    > Laura
    >
    > -----Original Message-----
    > From: firewall-wizards-admin@honor.icsalabs.com
    > [mailto:firewall-wizards-admin@honor.icsalabs.com]On Behalf Of R. DuFresne
    > Sent: Thursday, April 22, 2004 1:11 PM
    > To: Carric Dooley
    > Cc: Chuck Vose; firewall-wizards@honor.icsalabs.com
    > Subject: Re: [fw-wiz] Stanford break in
    >
    >
    > >
    > > Network synced passwords are the only way to manage a large number of
    > > users. If you have 10 workstations and 1 server, it might be fine to
    > > have no network directory, but with 300,000 users, I would say it's
    > > impossible. I would consider: LDAP, NDS, AD, SecureID, RADIUS, TACACS.
    > > (notice the conspicuous absence of NIS, and I wanted to leave out AD,
    > > but it seems to be unavoidable these days.
    > >
    >
    >
    > HP made this usless, unless they have finally enabled a shadow setup in new
    > versions of the OS. We played the single sing-on game at nortel, and played
    > with password cracking and all that, but, since 80% of the servers were hp's
    > and they lacked any seperation of passwords from the required /etc/passwd
    > file, users wanting to up their privs on a system just took copies of the
    > /etc/passwd file home and cracked to the point they felt they needed. And
    > our CISSP's spent alot of time putting together all these metrics on strong
    > passwords and how effective they were making security of the network,
    > without facing the reality of the 80% exposure faced. HP folks a few years
    > ago hinted that HP was going to change theit OS to include shadow password
    > implimentations, but, I've long since moved on and these days don;t have to
    > play on much but SUN's and AIX systems, so I do not know if they have
    > something beside the horrid TCB that would break most interal apps for
    > companies and require alot of retrofitting.
    >
    > Thanks,
    >
    > Ron DuFresne
    > --
    > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    > admin & senior security consultant: sysinfo.com
    > http://sysinfo.com
    >
    > "Cutting the space budget really restores my faith in humanity. It
    > eliminates dreams, goals, and ideals and lets us get straight to the
    > business of hate, debauchery, and self-annihilation."
    > -- Johnny Hart
    >
    > testing, only testing, and damn good at it too!
    >
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    -- 
    Carric Dooley
    COM2:Interactive Media
    http://www.com2usa.com
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