RE: IPS (was: [fw-wiz] Sources for Extranet Designs?)

From: Kowsik Guruswamy (KGuruswa_at_netscreen.com)
Date: 02/27/04

  • Next message: Paul Robertson: "Re: IPS (was: [fw-wiz] Sources for Extranet Designs?)"
    To: "'Christopher Lee'" <clee@myhome.homeip.net>, "'Stiennon,Richard'" <Richard.Stiennon@gartner.com>, "'Ben Nagy'" <ben@iagu.net>, firewall-wizards@honor.icsalabs.com
    Date: Fri, 27 Feb 2004 09:33:04 -0800
    
    

    Pretty much any layer-7 processing for TCP traffic mandates TCP stream
    reassembly. Looking at TCP segments, one at a time, really doesn't get you
    anywhere.

    Yes, Netscreen IDP does perform reassembly [and a lot more] before
    inspection.

    K.

    ps: I work for Netscreen.

    > -----Original Message-----
    > From: Christopher Lee [mailto:clee@myhome.homeip.net]
    > Sent: Thursday, February 26, 2004 7:45 PM
    > To: 'Stiennon,Richard'; 'Ben Nagy';
    > firewall-wizards@honor.icsalabs.com
    > Subject: RE: IPS (was: [fw-wiz] Sources for Extranet Designs?)
    >
    >
    > Just an FYI. Radware's DefensePro (or its IPS add-on on
    > their platform, in
    > general) does not do packet re-assembly (i.e. reconstruction
    > of the data
    > streams/sessions), it merely does string-matchings on the
    > packets alone. I
    > don't know Netscreen IDP, but I am curious to know if (and
    > how) it actually
    > reassembles packets before its inspection...
    >
    > Chris
    >
    > -----Original Message-----
    > From: firewall-wizards-admin@honor.icsalabs.com
    > [mailto:firewall-wizards-admin@honor.icsalabs.com] On Behalf Of
    > Stiennon,Richard
    > Sent: February 26, 2004 12:51 PM
    > To: Ben Nagy; firewall-wizards@honor.icsalabs.com
    > Subject: RE: IPS (was: [fw-wiz] Sources for Extranet Designs?)
    >
    > Here are the definitions I am working with:
    >
    > Network IPS:
    >
    > An inline device that assembles packets into streams or
    > sessions and parses
    > them.
    > Multiple methodologies to determine malicious intent. Usually includes
    > signature, protocol anomaly, behavior and flow capabilities.
    > The ability to drop sessions associated with attacks. Note, this is
    > dramatically different than a firewall that can close
    > *connections* based on
    > source-destination-port.
    >
    > Definitions are often helped out by a set of reference
    > vendors. In my mind,
    > Tippingpoint, TopLayer, Radware, NAI Intrushield, Netscreen
    > IDP, Reflex
    > Security and even Checkpoint Intrespect all fit this definition.
    >
    > Host IPS:
    >
    > A software shim (firewall) that sits between the kernel and
    > the application.
    > System calls are intercepted and blocked if they are outside
    > the "allow"
    > policy. Much simpler space with only three vendors, Cisco
    > Secure Agent (was
    > Okena), NAI Entercept, and Sana Security. A start up called
    > Araksha is also
    > looking at this space but they go much deeper into the
    > application at run
    > time.
    >
    >
    > The firewall vendors are excited by IPS because it is a
    > product that can be
    > deployed deep inside a network. Initial traction is being
    > gained at public
    > universities, mostly in the US where there is an objection to
    > firewalls
    > based on "academic freedom". Some of the network IPS vendors
    > are profiting
    > from the need to throttle undesirable traffic (file sharing) at
    > universities.
    >
    > Best,
    >
    > -Richard Stiennon
    >
    >
    > -----Original Message-----
    > From: firewall-wizards-admin@honor.icsalabs.com
    > [mailto:firewall-wizards-admin@honor.icsalabs.com]On Behalf
    > Of Ben Nagy
    > Sent: Thursday, February 26, 2004 9:06 AM
    > To: firewall-wizards@honor.icsalabs.com
    > Subject: RE: IPS (was: [fw-wiz] Sources for Extranet Designs?)
    >
    >
    > Can I just jump in and ask what _exactly_ people think "IPS"
    > means? I know
    > I'm asking for a definition debate and we've all seen a bunch
    > of those over
    > the years, but I'm concerned that the "buzzword" factor has lead to
    > compression in terms of vocab.
    >
    > I don't see the basic "attach an IDS to a firewall and have
    > the firewall do
    > stuff based on signatures" concept as amazingly useful (my personal
    > opinion). However lots of companies are producing stuff which
    > they are also
    > calling IPS (us included; consider that a disclaimer).
    >
    > Intrusion Prevention can be done at a number of places
    >
    > 1. The Firewall
    > 2. The Network (inline IPS lives here)
    > 3. The Host (cross platform issues here!)
    > - 3a. The Host Network level (TDI or driver stuff, where the
    > current PFWs
    > live)
    > - 3b. The Host Kernel / Memory Mangement level (systrace,
    > pax, and their
    > windows friends)
    >
    > Of those places, we can work on
    >
    > 1. Attack Signatures (easy to evade, prone to false
    > positives, reactive)
    > 2. Anomaly detection (statistical stuff, less configuration, foolable)
    > 3. Rule Based (hard to program, slower, better suited to a host model)
    > 4. Traffic / rate based.
    >
    > There is a lot of technical depth to the pros and cons of
    > each approach [1].
    > My own opinion is that the problem of malware, worms and the
    > newer attack
    > vectors (VPN, wireless, laptops etc) pretty much makes it
    > pointless to focus
    > too much on FW based IPS.
    >
    > Basically, firewalls are perimeter based, have huge problems
    > coping with
    > threats that are above the network level, and it's always
    > going to be hard
    > work to stretch their capacities. Witness the profound marketing and
    > technical failure of the proxy firewall, for example. (ok,
    > maybe that sounds
    > like a troll. ;)
    >
    > However, even the crappiest personal firewall has a
    > reasonable chance to
    > contain malware by using application firewalling (this app
    > can bind ports
    > this one can't). The ways that is being approached today is pretty
    > primitive, and there is a lot of work to do - yes - but it's
    > a start. I see
    > future potentiallllllll in an anomaly based approach which
    > can really step
    > in at the network level - buuut...
    >
    > Anyways, I'll restrict the rant, but the point is that it's
    > an overused
    > term, it's Gartnerised, but it's genuinely interesting. I'd
    > love to hear
    > some of your opinions about the viability of the various approaches -
    > because it's fairly clear that we need _some_ new approach.
    >
    > ben
    >
    > [1] European readers with too much time on their hands could
    > come and hear
    > me waffle about this at Infosecurity Europe. Those of you out
    > there who know
    > more about this than I do are welcome to clue me up in advance. ;)
    >
    > > -----Original Message-----
    > > From: firewall-wizards-admin@honor.icsalabs.com
    > > [mailto:firewall-wizards-admin@honor.icsalabs.com] On Behalf
    > > Of Don Parker
    > > Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 12:00 AM
    > > To: Marcus J. Ranum; Wes Noonan; 'Baumann, Sean C.'; 'R. DuFresne'
    > > Cc: 'Paul Robertson'; firewall-wizards@honor.icsalabs.com
    > > Subject: RE: [fw-wiz] Sources for Extranet Designs?
    > >
    > > Yes indeed IPS is an excellent technology that is slowly
    > > maturing. There is still nothing wrong with the IDS though.
    > [...]
    > >
    > > On Feb 23, "Marcus J. Ranum" <mjr@ranum.com> wrote:
    > >
    > > Wes Noonan wrote:
    > > >IPS would be a no brainer for me in this scenario.
    > >
    > > I. Hate. To. Admit. It. But. You. May. Be Right.
    > >
    > > IPS hype aside, and ignoring what the Gartner idiots think,
    > > there's a conceptual value to the IPS concept. Basically, a
    > > firewall implements one of 2 policies:
    > > - Permit
    > > - Deny
    > >
    > > IPS (i.e.: a signature-based firewall) adds a third option to
    > > the policy matrix:
    > > - Permit
    > > - Deny
    > > - Permit it as long as it is not obviously abusive
    > > (e.g.: signature
    > > hasn't fired)
    >
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  • Next message: Paul Robertson: "Re: IPS (was: [fw-wiz] Sources for Extranet Designs?)"

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