RE: [fw-wiz] Sources for Extranet Designs?

From: Mitchell Rowton (mrowton_at_bdo.com)
Date: 02/23/04

  • Next message: Daniel Linder: "RE: [fw-wiz] Sources for Extranet Designs?"
    To: <firewall-wizards@honor.icsalabs.com>, <alberti@sanction.net>
    Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2004 15:33:35 -0500
    
    

    I *think* this depends on what you tell your customers when they sign
    on. If they signed an access form that says "yada yada, we are not
    responsible for security" then it doesn't seem like you would be liable
    at all. Providing that you attempt to provide reasonable security
    measures. What is reasonable is up to lawyers, judges and such.

    But I would think that if you had a extranet policy and connection
    agreement (see link) you would be fairly safe with a good attorney.
    http://www.securitydocs.com/links/detail/345

    I (and most of you) would also consider having a firewall to enforce
    the security controls outlined in your policy to be reasonable. But how
    much money to you spend to secure customers from other customers?

    Mitchell

    >>> "Bob Alberti" <alberti@sanction.net> 02/23/04 03:08PM >>>
    One thing I always wonder about in Extranet designs: how liable are
    you
    (the host of the Extranet) if two of your Extranet customers are
    competitors? If Customer A can hack your Extranet to, for instance,
    inspect
    Customer B's orders, or even to hack Customer B's network, how liable
    are
    you for not providing a more secure Extranet environment?

    Its one thing to protect the host organization from Extranet clients:
    its
    another entirely to protect clients from each other.

    -----Original Message-----
    From: firewall-wizards-admin@honor.icsalabs.com
    [mailto:firewall-wizards-admin@honor.icsalabs.com]On Behalf Of Wes
    Noonan
    Sent: Monday, February 23, 2004 1:31 PM
    To: 'Baumann, Sean C.'; 'R. DuFresne'
    Cc: 'Paul Robertson'; firewall-wizards@honor.icsalabs.com
    Subject: RE: [fw-wiz] Sources for Extranet Designs?

    > 1.) If you say you should never allow access to resources on your
    > protected or internal network, how do you handle giving access to
    > services that reside on machines that cannot be duplicated (i.e.
    > expensive mainframes)?

    There are a couple of approaches that I can think of off hand. Approach
    1 is
    to design the services with extranet connections in mind. Simply put,
    maybe
    the mainframe isn't the right place to house that resource. This is
    probably
    not the answer that you want to hear though. Approach 2 is to accept
    that
    you have a business limitation that is going to force you to implement
    a
    less than ideal security solution. At that point, you mitigate it.
    What
    precise ports need to be opened from the extranet to the internal
    resource
    and grant *only* that access. If they need SQL access but not NFS
    access
    then make sure that your firewall only permits SQL traffic to pass
    between
    the two networks. Things like that.

    > 2.) Do most companies require routable address on their extranet?
    > Currently we use RFC1918 address for our extranet, but we see that
    this
    > will become a problem in the future as we add partners.

    Depends. Assuming that you are going to be using firewalls and
    advertising
    your internal resources as something else (through the use of NAT,
    etc.)
    then you can do that and make the routable addresses what the extranet
    partners think they are going to connect with. That being said, you
    can
    pretty much pick any RFC1918 address space at that point and use it in
    a
    similar fashion. The obvious alternative is that someone will need to
    change
    their address space.

    More detailed design you will probably have to pay me for. :-)

    One thing that this scenario really graphically depicts is why
    separation of
    resources is such a valuable objective. Sure, it sounds really nice to
    have
    all your stuff running on a mainframe running Linux hosts but these are
    the
    kinds of security problems you will then run into. (feel free to expand
    this
    statement as you see fit - i.e. integrated firewall/ids/content
    filter/spam
    control/virus scanning or separate switches vs. VLANs).

    HTH

    Wes Noonan
    mailinglists@wjnconsulting.com
    http://www.wjnconsulting.com
    Hardening Network Infrastructure - A concise how to guide
    Available Spring 2004
    Order at http://tinyurl.com/2nof4

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  • Next message: Daniel Linder: "RE: [fw-wiz] Sources for Extranet Designs?"

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