Re: [fw-wiz] What challenges are security admins facing?
ark_at_eltex.net
Date: 05/28/03
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To: Paul Robertson <proberts@patriot.net> Date: Wed, 28 May 2003 20:53:27 +0400
nuqneH
On Wed, May 28, 2003 at 12:33:44PM -0400, Paul Robertson wrote:
> > network usage policy. People DO use computers at their workplace for
> > personal needs and its OKAY. There are some cases when it is not
>
> Sometimes it's okay, and sometimes it's not- that's highly dependent on
> what that personal usage is (playing pirated copyrighted content would not
> be ok in most places, nor would browsing porn sites, and certainly handing
> out administrative accounts for your friends to use would be frowned
> upon.)
Sure. These restrictions seem reasonable in most places. But restricting
access by limiting it to pre-defined set of "work-related" sites
actually encouraged users to do dirty tricks in almost 90% of
companies i've seen it in.
>
> > Enforcing a fascist set of restrictions just makes users extremely
> > creative to avoid it. Keeping restrictions reasonable makes it possible
>
> Getting rid of the creative ones tends to work like natural selection.
And sometimes it works the wrong way. The remaining ones hide well and
cause more trouble finally ;-). Many comanies that try to enforce
restrictive policies simply do not have enough resources to track down
violations. If they had policy less restrictive, they could.
(talking now with a girl that works for one of those. she is not
allowed to use email at work, thus she spent some WORKING time to
find a way around it. i doubt it is what they want)
>
> [snip]
>
> > gets fscked really bad - but to make things work this way the administrator
> > should allow him to do it if it is really innocent. Otherwise he
>
> How does the admin kno wif it's "really innocent?"
Maintaining the list,if the thing is not on the list he should suggest
something of close functionality..
>
> > Another problem is, again, management. Ever seen a big boss that
> > says "i need this videoconferencing software working today from my
> > desktop, so please poke a hole in firewall to make it work - it
> > is IMPORTANT! no, we do not have time for security analisys, we need
> > it NOW! No, i do not want to do it from dedicated notebook machine".
> > The point is obvious. Why designing and implementing
> > crafty security policy just to have it ruined this way?
>
> My standard answer of "No." worked for everyone from the person in the
> mail room to the CEO of a multibillion dollar company when I was running
> firewalls daily. Perhaps this too is part of the responsibility?
Yes.
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- Previous message: Monkman, Brian: "RE: [fw-wiz] Benefit of firewall over NAT-only 'protected' networ k"
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