Re: [fw-wiz] rpc.statd message log

From: R. DuFresne (dufresne@sysinfo.com)
Date: 04/24/03

  • Next message: Melson, Paul: "RE: [fw-wiz] rpc.statd message log"
    From: "R. DuFresne" <dufresne@sysinfo.com>
    To: "Robert E. Martin" <rmartin@fishburne.org>
    Date: Thu, 24 Apr 2003 12:52:21 -0400 (EDT)
    

    RPC services have a drmatically bad history in the security realm, and
    accross platforms and vendors. Spoits are all over the place for various
    OS's. Patches can help some, but, for exposed systems the services should
    be closed off and/or protected from external exposure by proper setup and
    filtering. Discovering when/how/by whom/what's affected|changed in the
    case of a compromise or suspected compromise can be a tough task. Tools
    that can aid in discovering what might have been trojaned or rootkitted,
    include, but are not limited to: tripwire/md5 binary checksums of the
    criticall OS files and dirs. If your exposed machines are not scanned at
    least daily by a file integrity checker like those mentioned, then one
    would be better off to have a fault tolerant backup/recovery system for
    those exposed servers. Or if one can get by with a read only <bootable
    CD> OS to help mitigate the potential and affects of compromise.

    Log analysis, passwd/group files analysis, and a detailed audit of the
    base OS might help define if this statd service was indeed remotely
    overflowed and resulted in a compromise, or if it had been patched or hit
    by a sploit that it only logged evidence of attempt. Of course, the
    truely paranoid only bother with such forensics if they intend to
    prosecute and just wipe and reinstall from backups or reboot the
    non-writeable OS to clean up.

    Thanks,

    Ron DuFresne

    On Thu, 24 Apr 2003, Robert E. Martin wrote:

    > I found this in my /var/log/messages log ........
    >
    > Apr 21 11:07:01 fms rpc.statd[1010]: gethostbyname error for
    > ^X÷ÿ¿^X÷ÿ¿^Z÷ÿ¿^Z÷ÿ¿%8x%8x%8x%8x%8x%8x%8x%8x%8x%62716x%hn%51
    > 859x%hn\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\2
    > 20\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\22
    > 0\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220
    > \220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\
    > 220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\2
    > 20\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\22
    > 0\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220
    > \220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220
    >
    > I believe that the machine has been compromised, but do not find any
    > trace using cert.org recommended Intruder Detection Checklist. I have
    > stopped the rpc.statd service, since we don't use this at ALL!
    > http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/34043
    > Any thoughts? Anyone?
    >
    >

    -- 
    ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
            admin & senior security consultant:  sysinfo.com
                            http://sysinfo.com
    "Cutting the space budget really restores my faith in humanity.  It
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    business of hate, debauchery, and self-annihilation."
                    -- Johnny Hart
    testing, only testing, and damn good at it too!
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  • Next message: Melson, Paul: "RE: [fw-wiz] rpc.statd message log"

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