Re: [fw-wiz] CERT vulnerability note VU# 539363
From: Frank Knobbe (fknobbe@knobbeits.com)
Date: 10/16/02
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From: Frank Knobbe <fknobbe@knobbeits.com> To: "Paul D. Robertson" <proberts@patriot.net> Date: Wed Oct 16 12:02:31 2002
On Wed, 2002-10-16 at 08:36, Paul D. Robertson wrote:
> [...]
> If you're hosting public resources behind the same firewall that's
> protecting everything else in your enterprise, you've probably made a
> questionable architectural decision. If you're keeping state on say
> inbound SMTP traffic, the question is "Why?" If the 'Net as a whole can
> connect to something, the state itself isn't going to do much good.
Not for inbound connections, but doesn't a stateful firewall prevent
non-legit outbound connections? If the firewall protecting a web server
were stateless (read packet filter), the web server could establish
connections to the outside with a source port of 80, and a backdoor
would be able to connect to its master. However, if state is kept, and
only inbound connections to port 80 are allowed, then the backdoor can
not establish a connection to the outside using source port 80.
To me it seems that stateless access control only protects my side from
incoming traffic, but I also want to enforce access control on outbound
traffic. In order to distinquish between a valid response, and a new
connection, isn't state helpful?
I understand that I could filter any packets from the web server (in
above example) by denying packets with SYN flag set, so maybe above rant
is only valid for UDP. But in general I believe state is useful in
access control. Or am I way off?
Regards,
Frank
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