RE: [fw-wiz] VPN concentrators

From: Patrick Darden (darden@armc.org)
Date: 08/27/02


From: Patrick Darden <darden@armc.org>
To: scouser@paradise.net.nz
Date: Tue Aug 27 09:29:01 2002

Well, if it is remote pc---->network connections, then you can control the
end user's security pretty securely. Simply have a remote network access
policy that states a minimum security allowance, and have your vpn client
check for these before allowing a tunnel. Something like: Norton Internet
Security with an update within the last 7 days; or black ice plus
kaspersky; etc. If your client can't check for these things, then you
could write a wrapper to check for them on the hard drive easily enough,
or check the registry to see if they are installed and "on".

--
--Patrick Darden                Internetworking Manager             
--                              706.475.3312    darden@armc.org
--                              Athens Regional Medical Center
On Tue, 27 Aug 2002 scouser@paradise.net.nz wrote:
> OK some but not all answers
> It is for remote users, so it would be Client to Device (initially :P)
> So users would be employees. (totally untrsutworthy :P)
> Client software would probably depend on Device as a number of beneficial
> features can be used if you match the client to the device (personal firewalls,
> autmated upgrading of clients etc...)
> users would be about 250 initially but up to 4000 potentially in the future.
> availability would be an issue but this would be dealt with by the architecture
> design and would not be dependant on the solution.
> Management I would presume would depend on the device, ie LSMS for a brick etc...
> Central managament is an important issue however.
> 
> 
> Not sure what you mean by access control? Do you mean to internal resources? If
> VPN traffic could be split inot different network pools then internal NIDS, and
> ACLs could manage this (along with obvious host/resource access controls)
> 
> What are tehses mysterious "IPSEC issues" that we are all aware of ( or perhaps
> not in my case) ??
> 
> 
> James
> 
> Quoting Ofir Arkin <ofir@sys-security.com>:
> 
> > All,
> > 
> > No one even looked at a number of other critical questions:
> > 
> > - Is this a Device to Device VPN?
> > - Is this a Client to Device VPN?
> > - Both?
> > - What information needs to go through that VPN?
> > - Who uses the VPN? Trusted entity? Your grand mother?
> > - What is that trusted entity's security?
> > - Can we trust it? (of course not)
> > - What is the client software used (shame on you all not mentioning
> > that
> > :P) 
> > - IPSEC - there are a number of issues here to remind you all.
> > - Management
> > - Access Controls
> > - Number of users using the VPN
> > - Availability issues 
> > - Etc.
> > 
> > People should look at the bigger picture and not at the box. 
> > The bigger pictures than will tell us what boxes you can, or cannot
> > use.
> > 
> > By the way - a VPN is not a firewall...
> > The encrypted traffic hitting the VPN must be validated after
> > decryption
> > is performed... This is the reason why, sometimes, a VPN+Firewall in
> > one
> > box (e.g. checkpoint) will be a good solution, or a
> > firewall-VPN-firewall "sandwich" will be also used.
> >  
> > 
> > Just my 2c.
> > 
> > Ofir Arkin [ofir@sys-security.com]
> > Founder
> > The Sys-Security Group
> > http://www.sys-security.com
> > PGP CC2C BE53 12C6 C9F2 87B1 B8C6 0DFA CF2D D360 43FA 
> > 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: firewall-wizards-admin@honor.icsalabs.com
> > [mailto:firewall-wizards-admi n@honor.icsalabs.com] On Behalf Of
> > Patrick
> > Darden
> > Sent: 26 August 2002 15:52
> > To: Dave Piscitello
> > Cc: scouser@paradise.net.nz; firewall-wizards@honor.icsalabs.com
> > Subject: Re: [fw-wiz] VPN concentrators
> > 
> > 
> > Actually, what you describe is only slightly different from what I
> > describe. I can't really think of any differences, except that yours
> > may
> > cost less but possibly provide less performance....
> > 
> > --
> > --Patrick Darden Internetworking Manager 
> > -- 706.475.3312 darden@armc.org
> > -- Athens Regional Medical Center
> > 
> > 
> > On Mon, 26 Aug 2002, Dave Piscitello wrote:
> > 
> > > Goes to show you that "best thinking" is subjective.
> > > 
> > > Firewall appliances with crypto acceleration for IPsec and an
> > optional/DMZ 
> > > port satisfy most site requirements without all the extra hardware, 
> > > addressing/subnetting, and routing issues (how you return IPsec
> > traffic 
> > > when you have FW and VPN appliance in parallel isn't a simple
> > "default
> > 
> > > gateway is the firewall" config on the internal network). You also
> > don't 
> > > have to manage policy across multiple systems with multiple UIs, and
> > you 
> > > don't have to deal with multiple sources of logging and reporting of
> > policy 
> > > violations.
> > > 
> > > I'm happy with this arrangement.
> > > 
> > > At 08:39 AM 8/26/2002 -0400, Patrick Darden wrote:
> > > >Here is the current best thinking, to my knowledge:
> > > >
> > > > ds3 to internet
> > > > |
> > > > |
> > > >---------------
> > > >Bastion Router|
> > > >---------------
> > > > | |
> > > > | \
> > > >firewall \
> > > > | vpn engine
> > > > | |
> > > >==================
> > > >internal network |
> > > >==================
> > > 
> > > 
> > > David M. Piscitello
> > > Core Competence, Inc. &
> > > 3 Myrtle Bank Lane
> > > Hilton Head, SC 29926
> > > dave@corecom.com
> > > 843.689.5595
> > > www.corecom.com
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > firewall-wizards mailing list
> > > firewall-wizards@honor.icsalabs.com
> > > http://honor.icsalabs.com/mailman/listinfo/firewall-wizards
> > > 
> > 
> > _______________________________________________
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> > 
> > 
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> >  
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