Re: [fw-wiz] VPN concentrators
From: B. Scott Harroff (Scott.Harroff@att.net)
Date: 08/26/02
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From: "B. Scott Harroff" <Scott.Harroff@att.net> To: "Patrick Darden" <darden@armc.org>, <scouser@paradise.net.nz> Date: Mon Aug 26 11:14:06 2002
I agree with you from the trust perspective.
It is nice though to be able to filter/log/monitor undesirable inbound VPN
traffic though; and this would need to be post VPN device most likely by a
firewall of some ttype.
----- Original Message -----
From: "Patrick Darden" <darden@armc.org>
To: <scouser@paradise.net.nz>
Cc: <firewall-wizards@honor.icsalabs.com>
Sent: Monday, August 26, 2002 8:39 AM
Subject: Re: [fw-wiz] VPN concentrators
>
> I don't agree. Putting authenticated and authorized traffic through a
> firewall is redundant. IPSEC traffic is trusted traffic. A VPN is an
> extension of your network--it is as trusted as any traffic internal to
> your network--perhaps more, as it can be completely accounted
> for--remember that every packet has a confirmed sip, dip, and payload.
>
> Here is the current best thinking, to my knowledge:
>
> ds3 to internet
> |
> |
> ---------------
> Bastion Router|
> ---------------
> | |
> | \
> firewall \
> | vpn engine
> | |
> ==================
> internal network |
> ==================
>
>
>
>
> --
> --Patrick Darden Internetworking Manager
> -- 706.475.3312 darden@armc.org
> -- Athens Regional Medical Center
>
>
> On Mon, 26 Aug 2002 scouser@paradise.net.nz wrote:
>
> > Off topic slightly, sorry.
> >
> > Current best thinking is to terminate VPN tunnels inside an external
firewall on
> > a DMZ, then traffic can be passed back through this or another firewall
before
> > entering the internal network.
> >
> > Complexity can lead to vulnerabilities, so what are peoples thoughts on
> > termination of vpn tunnels on the firewall itself? What are the pros
and cons
> > as you see them?
> >
> > thanks in advance
> > James
> > _______________________________________________
> > firewall-wizards mailing list
> > firewall-wizards@honor.icsalabs.com
> > http://honor.icsalabs.com/mailman/listinfo/firewall-wizards
> >
>
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- Next message: B. Scott Harroff: "Re: RE:[fw-wiz] Vulnerability Scanners ( was: concerning ~el8 / project mayhem )"
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