Re: [fw-wiz] Securing a Linux Firewall
From: John McDermott (jjm@jkintl.com)
Date: 07/23/02
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From: John McDermott <jjm@jkintl.com> To: Carson Gaspar <carson@taltos.org> Date: Tue Jul 23 18:14:01 2002
Carson Gaspar wrote:
>> Everything on the box that you don't need is a potential way for someone
>> to grab control of an executable which can cause damage. Just because
>> the
>> image isn't executed during init processing doesn't mean that someone
>> can't start it up some other way.
> If the binary grants no additional privileges, then it can do nothing
> the attacker couldn't do already. If you can execute shell code, you can
> copy bits onto the box (at your current privilege level) - assuming
> there is at least one writable directory on the box.
This, I believe, presumes that you are *100% sure* that the given binary
can grant no additional privs. I am seldom that sure about software.
>
> So far, the only comments I've received that make sense are:
>
> - Not having the binary in the expected location prevents skript kiddiez
> attacks from suceeding
>
> In my opinion, this provides minimal additional security. My threat
> model is a determined attacker, not a clueless scriptoid.
Then you should care even more. Why leave something around that cen be
exploited even if you personally don't know how to use it in an attack?
I prefer to err on the side of caution and remove anything not needed.
> - If the binary isn't on the box, nobody can enable the service by accident
>
> True. But I feel that a regular system config audit is a better way of
> confirming that nobody's done anything unfortunate.
Yes, it is better, but I prefer to use both.
>
> There are a few reasons I don't like the "strip everything off the box"
> mentality.
>
> - It frequently makes debugging problems nearly impossible, as the
> necessary tools are not present.
One easy solution is to create a CD of the tools you want to use. Most
of the debugging tools can be run from a CD with no problem. When you
are out of debugging mode and back to production mode, remove the CD.
>
> - Every time a patch or a new OS version is released, the set of files
> that are required changes. Also, new privileged binaries may appear.
Yes. Tools like tripwire help with this. I also tend to do
touch /UPDATED_yyyymmdd
so I can easily do a 'find -newer'.
>
> I've had to maintain "jumpstart"-like images for secure servers.
> Maintaining a "known-good" list for privileged binaries is relatively
> straightforward. Maintaining a "known-good" list of _all_ binaries is a
> nightmare. I further assert that maintaining a "known-bad" list is a
> lost cause.
>
I may be confused, but to me that sounds like "make a list of the few
programs the firewall needs and only put those on the jumpstart CD".
This means removing all unused packages from the system before creating
the "jumpstart"-like CD.
Also consider
- reload-time. I like to have a ghost image (or similar) of my firewall
(in addition to a hot copy of the disk if there is money) so I can
restore the firewall if it crashes. A smaller system is easier to restore.
- audit time. It is easier to audit a system with fewer packages than
one with lots of packages. (I am not saying, "make one big package"; I
mean "more software is more difficult to audit".)
BTW, Marcus once wrote about an idea of creating a firewall by starting
with a kernel and just a few basic utilities and then *adding* only the
necessary software (as opposed to removing the unnecessary). While I
have yet to try this, it sounds difficult but probably more secure to me.
--john
-- John McDermott Writer, Educator, Consultant jjm@jkintl.com V +1 505/377-6293 F +1 505/377-6313
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