CERT Advisory CA-2003-25 Buffer Overflow in Sendmail

From: CERT Advisory (cert-advisory_at_cert.org)
Date: 09/18/03

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    CERT Advisory CA-2003-25 Buffer Overflow in Sendmail

       Original issue date: September 18, 2003
       Last revised: --
       Source: CERT/CC

       A complete revision history is at the end of this file.

    Systems Affected

         * Systems running open-source sendmail versions prior to 8.12.10,
           including UNIX and Linux systems

         * Commercial releases of sendmail including Sendmail Switch,
           Sendmail Advanced Message Server (SAMS), and Sendmail for NT

    Overview

       A vulnerability in sendmail could allow a remote attacker to execute
       arbitrary code with the privileges of the sendmail daemon, typically
       root.

    I. Description

       Sendmail is a widely deployed mail transfer agent (MTA). Many UNIX and
       Linux systems provide a sendmail implementation that is enabled and
       running by default. Sendmail contains a vulnerability in its address
       parsing code. An error in the prescan() function could allow an
       attacker to write past the end of a buffer, corrupting memory
       structures. Depending on platform and operating system architecture,
       the attacker may be able to execute arbitrary code with a specially
       crafted email message.

       This vulnerability is different than the one described in CA-2003-12.

       The email attack vector is message-oriented as opposed to
       connection-oriented. This means that the vulnerability is triggered by
       the contents of a specially crafted email message rather than by
       lower-level network traffic. This is important because an MTA that
       does not contain the vulnerability may pass the malicious message
       along to other MTAs that may be protected at the network level. In
       other words, vulnerable sendmail servers on the interior of a network
       are still at risk, even if the site's border MTA uses software other
       than sendmail. Also, messages capable of exploiting this vulnerability
       may pass undetected through packet filters or firewalls.

       Further information is available in VU#784980. Common Vulnerabilities
       and Exposures (CVE) refers to this issue as CAN-2003-0694.

    II. Impact

       Depending on platform and operating system architecture, a remote
       attacker could execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the
       sendmail daemon. Unless the RunAsUser option is set, Sendmail
       typically runs as root.

    III. Solution

    Upgrade or apply a patch

       This vulnerability is resolved in Sendmail 8.12.10. Sendmail has also
       released a patch that can be applied to Sendmail 8.9.x through 8.12.9.
       Information about specific vendors is available in Appendix A. and in
       the Systems Affected section of VU#784980.

       Sendmail 8.12.10 is designed to correct malformed messages that are
       transferred by the server. This should help protect other vulnerable
       sendmail servers.

    Enable the RunAsUser option

       While there is no known complete workaround, consider setting the
       RunAsUser option to reduce the impact of this vulnerability. It is
       typically considered to be a good security practice to limit the
       privileges of applications and services whenever possible.

    Appendix A. Vendor Information

       This appendix contains information provided by vendors. When vendors
       report new information, this section is updated, and the changes are
       noted in the revision history. If a vendor is not listed below, we
       have not received their direct statement. Further vendor information
       is available in the Systems Affected section of VU#784980.

    Debian

         The sendmail and sendmail-wide packages are vulnerable to this
         issue. Updated packages are being prepared and will be available
         soon.

    F5 Networks

         BIG-IP and 3-DNS products are not vulnerable.

    IBM

         The AIX Security Team is aware of the issues discussed in CERT
         Vulnerability Note VU#784980.

         The following APARs will be released to address this issue:

          APAR number for AIX 4.3.3: IY48659 (available approx. 10/03/03)
          APAR number for AIX 5.1.0: IY48658 (available approx. 10/15/03)
          APAR number for AIX 5.2.0: IY48657 (available approx. 10/29/03)

         An e-fix will be available shortly. The e-fix will be available
         from:

         ftp://ftp.software.ibm.com/aix/efixes/security/sendmail_4_efix.tar.Z

         This vendor statement will be updated when the e-fix becomes
         available.

    Lotus

         This is a sendmail-specific issue that does not affect any Lotus
         products.

    Network Appliance

         NetApp products are not vulnerable to this problem.

    NetBSD

         NetBSD-current ships with sendmail 8.12.9 since June 1, 2003. The
         patch was applied on September 17, 2003. In the near future we
         would upgrade to sendmail 8.12.10.

         Our official releases, such as NetBSD 1.6.1, are also affected
         (they ship with older version of sendmail). They will be patched as
         soon as possible. We would issue NetBSD Security Advisory on this
         matter.

    Openwall GNU/*/Linux

         Openwall GNU/*/Linux is not vulnerable. We ship Postfix, not
         Sendmail.

    Red Hat

         Red Hat Linux and Red Hat Enterprise Linux ship with a Sendmail
         package vulnerable to these issues. Updated Sendmail packages are
         available along with our advisory at the URLs below. Users of the
         Red Hat Network can update their systems using the 'up2date' tool.

         Red Hat Linux:

          http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2003-283.html

         Red Hat Enterprise Linux:

          http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2003-284.html

    The Sendmail Consortium

         The Sendmail Consortium recommends that sites upgrade to 8.12.10
         whenever possible. Alternatively, patches are available for 8.9,
         8.10, 8.11, and 8.12 on http://www.sendmail.org/.

    Sendmail Inc.

         All commercial releases including Sendmail Switch, Sendmail
         Advanced Message Server (which includes the Sendmail Switch MTA),
         Sendmail for NT, and Sendmail Pro are affected by this issue. Patch
         information is available at http://www.sendmail.com/security/.

    Sun

         Sun acknowledges that our recent release of sendmail 8.12.10 is
         affected by this issue on Solaris releases S7, S8 and S9.

         A Sun Alert for this issue will be isuued very soon which will then
         be available from:

          http://sunsolve.Sun.COM/pub-cgi/retrieve.pl?doc=fsalert/56860

         There are no patches available at this time. The Sun Alert will be
         updated with the patch information as it becomes available. Please
         refer to the Sun Alert when available, for more information.

    SuSE

         SuSE products shipping sendmail are affected. Update packages that
         fix the vulnerability are being prepared and will be published
         shortly.

    Appendix B. References

         * CERT/CC Vulnerability Note VU#784980 -
           <http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/784980>
         * Michal Zalewski's post to BugTraq -
           <http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/337839>
         * Sendmail 8.12.10 - <http://www.sendmail.org/8.12.10.html>
         * Sendmail patch for 8.12.9 -
           <http://www.sendmail.org/patches/parse8.359.2.8>
         * Sendmail 8.12.10 announcement -
           <http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/sendmail/2003-q3/0002.html
    >
         * Sendmail Secure Install -
           <http://www.sendmail.org/secure-install.html>
       
         _________________________________________________________________

       This vulnerability was discovered by Michal Zalewski. Thanks to Claus
       Assmann and Eric Allman of Sendmail for their help in preparing this
       document.
         _________________________________________________________________

       Feedback can be directed to the author, Art Manion.
       ______________________________________________________________________

       This document is available from:
       http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2003-25.html
       ______________________________________________________________________

    CERT/CC Contact Information

       Email: cert@cert.org
              Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
              Fax: +1 412-268-6989
              Postal address:
              CERT Coordination Center
              Software Engineering Institute
              Carnegie Mellon University
              Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
              U.S.A.

       CERT/CC personnel answer the hotline 08:00-17:00 EST(GMT-5) /
       EDT(GMT-4) Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies
       during other hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends.

    Using encryption

       We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email.
       Our public PGP key is available from

         http://www.cert.org/CERT_PGP.key

       If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for more
       information.

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       Copyright 2003 Carnegie Mellon University.

    Revision History

       September 18, 2003: Initial release

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