CERT Advisory CA-2001-34 Buffer Overflow in System V Derived Login

From: CERT Advisory (cert-advisory@cert.org)
Date: 12/13/01


Date: Wed, 12 Dec 2001 18:07:59 -0500 (EST)
From: CERT Advisory <cert-advisory@cert.org>
To: cert-advisory@cert.org


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CERT Advisory CA-2001-34 Buffer Overflow in System V Derived Login

   Original release date: December 12, 2001
   Last revised: --
   Source: CERT/CC

   A complete revision history can be found at the end of this file.

Systems Affected

     * IBM AIX versions 4.3 and 5.1
     * Hewlett-Packard's HP-UX
     * SCO OpenServer 5.0.6 and earlier
     * SGI IRIX 3.x
     * Sun Solaris 8 and earlier

Overview

   Several applications use login for authentication to the system. A
   remotely exploitable buffer overflow exists in login derived from
   System V. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability to gain root access
   to the server.

I. Description

   Several implementations of login that are derived from System V allow
   a user to specify arguments such as environment variables to the
   process. An array of buffers is used to store these arguments. A flaw
   exists in the checking of the number of arguments accepted. This flaw
   permits the array of buffers to be overflowed.

   On most systems, login is not suid; therefore, it runs as the user who
   called it. If, however, login is called by an application that runs
   with greater privileges than those of the user, such as telnetd or
   rlogind, then the user can exploit this vulnerability to gain the
   privileges of that program. In the case of telnetd or rlogind, root
   access is gained.

   Since in.telnetd and in.rlogind are available over the network, a
   remote attacker without any previous access to the system could use
   this vulnerability to gain root access to the system.

   If a program that invokes login is suid (or sgid) USER_A, then this
   can be exploited to gain the privileges of USER_A.

   An exploit exists and may be circulating.

II. Impact

   This vulnerability can be remotely exploited to gain privileges of the
   invoker of login. In the case of a program such as telnetd, rlogind,
   or other suid root programs, root access is gained.

III. Solution

Apply a patch from your vendor

   Appendix A contains information provided by vendors for this advisory.
   As vendors report new information to the CERT/CC, we will update this
   section and note the changes in our revision history. If a particular
   vendor is not listed below, we have not received their comments.
   Please review the VU#569272 for your vendor's status or contact your
   vendor directly.

Restrict access to login

   We recommend disabling TELNET, RLOGIN and other programs that use
   login for authentication. Do not use programs that use a vulnerable
   login for authentication. Note that some SSH applications can be
   configured to use login for authentication. If this configuration is
   selected, then you will still be vulnerable.

   If you cannot disable the service, you can limit your exposure to
   these vulnerabilities by using a router or firewall to restrict access
   to port 23/TCP (telnet) and port 513/TCP (rlogin). Note that this does
   not protect you against attackers from within your network.

Appendix A. - Vendor Information

   This appendix contains information provided by vendors for this
   advisory. As vendors report new information to the CERT/CC, we will
   update this section and note the changes in our revision history. If a
   particular vendor is not listed below, we have not received their
   comments.

Apple Computer, Inc.

   Mac OS X and Mac OS X Server are not vulnerable.

Caldera

   We are not using a SystemV based /bin/login, we are using the BSD
   originated rlogin tools. All OpenLinux products are 'Not Vulnerable'.

Compaq Computer Corporation

   Compaq's Tru64 Software is not impacted by this reported problem.

Cray Inc.

   Cray Inc. has determined that its implementation of login is not
   vulnerable to the situation described in VU#569272.

Hewlett-Packard

   HP-UX is NOT Exploitable, even though HP-UX does have the buffer
   overflow, and hence is listed as "effected" above. In any case, the
   buffer overflow has been fixed by HP.

IBM

   IBM's AIX operating system, versions 4.3 and 5.1, are susceptible to
   this vulnerability. We have prepared an emergency fix ("efix"),
   "tsmlogin_efix.tar.Z", and it is available for downloading from:
   
   ftp://aix.software.ibm.com/aix/efixes/security

   The APAR assignment for AIX 5.1 is IY26221, and will be available
   soon. The APAR for AIX 4.3 is pending, as a new level of 4.3 is nearly
   available. The "README" file at the above FTP site will be updated to
   provide the official fix information and availability.

NetBSD

   NetBSD does not use a System V derived login, and therefore, NetBSD is
   not vulnerable.

Red Hat

   Red Hat Linux does not use a System V derived /bin/login, and is
   therefore not vulnerable to this.

Sun Microsystems

   Sun has developed a fix and T-patches are being tested. Official
   patches will be released shortly and Sun will issue a Sun Security
   Bulletin when they are available.
     _________________________________________________________________

   The CERT Coordination Center thanks Internet Security Systems and Sun
   Microsystems for the technical information they provided.
     _________________________________________________________________

   Feedback on this document can be directed to the author,
   Jason A. Rafail
     _________________________________________________________________

   References
     * http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/569272
     * http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls
   ______________________________________________________________________

   This document is available from:
   http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-34.html
   ______________________________________________________________________

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   Revision History
December 12, 2001 : Initial Release

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